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ABSTRACT
Conventional hedonic techniques for estimating the value of local amenities rely on the assumption
that households move freely among locations. We show that when moving is costly, the variation
in housing prices and wages across locations may no longer reflect the value of differences in local
amenities. We develop an alternative discrete-choice approach that models the household location
decision directly, and we apply it to the case of air quality in U.S. metro areas in 1990 and 2000.
Because air pollution is likely to be correlated with unobservable local characteristics such as
economic activity, we instrument for air quality using the contribution of distant sources to local
pollution – excluding emissions from local sources, which are most likely to be correlated with local
conditions. Our model yields an estimated elasticity of willingness to pay with respect to air quality
of 0.34 to 0.42. These estimates imply that the median household would pay $149 to $185 (in
constant 1982-1984 dollars) for a one-unit reduction in average ambient concentrations of particulate
matter. These estimates are three times greater than the marginal willingness to pay estimated by a
conventional hedonic model using the same data. Our results are robust to a range of covariates,
instrumenting strategies, and functional form assumptions. The findings also confirm the importance









1  Introduction 
Since Rosen’s (1974) seminal paper, economists have used hedonic techniques to estimate the 
value of a wide range of amenities, including clean air, school quality, and lower crime rates.  The great 
attraction of the approach is that it uses observed behavior in housing and labor markets to infer the value 
of non-market goods.  On the standard assumption that individuals choose the residential locations that 
maximize their utility, marginal rates of substitution between local amenities and other goods will equal 
the price ratio.  Hence the marginal willingness to pay for those amenities can be measured by their 
implicit prices, as reflected in housing prices and wages. The broad avail of this approach, along with 
considerable  practical  interest  in  the  estimates  it  provides,  explains  the  continuing  interest  among 
economists in the theory and identification of hedonic models.
1 
This paper addresses a crucial but often overlooked assumption in hedonic models, and shows 
how that assumption may lead to biased estimates of willingness to pay for local amenities.  Hedonic 
models typically assume that people can move freely among locations when they buy homes and choose 
jobs.  If so, wages and rents must adjust to reflect the implicit prices of local amenities; hence, willingness 
to pay can be inferred from variation in housing prices and income.  The key assumption of perfect 
mobility, however, ignores an important feature of the real world: migration is costly.  Moving to a new 
city entails not only out-of-pocket costs, but (much more important) psychic costs of leaving behind one’s 
family and cultural roots.  Data on residential choices suggests that such costs are significant.  Table 1 
relates birth location to residential location: it shows that great majority of U.S. household heads reside in 
the region of their birth.  A similar pattern holds at the state level.  This strong revealed preference for 
staying close to home belies the assumption that residential choices reflect a simple tradeoff between 
local attributes and prevailing rents and wages.  If migration costs enter into residential location decisions, 
they should be considered by analysts measuring the value of local amenities. 
How  will  migration  costs  affect  estimates  of  willingness  to  pay?    Consider  an  exogenous 
improvement in air quality in a particular city.  In response, we would expect housing prices to rise and 
wages to fall until a new equilibrium is reached.  If migration is costless, these changes will fully reflect 
the value of the cleaner air.  But if migration is costly, the change in housing prices and wages must be 
smaller: the benefit someone gets from moving to the city must now compensate her not only for the 
higher rents and lower income, but also for the cost of moving.  To see the intuition, consider someone 
born in Detroit who would willingly pay $100 for the gain in air quality that she would get from moving 
to an otherwise identical neighborhood in Tucson.  If the disutility of moving to the new city is $40, she 2 
 
will move only if the difference in housing prices (net of income) is less than $60.  Hence the change in 
housing prices and wages that accompanies a change in air quality will understate willingness to pay for 
clean air.  Notice also that the extent of the understatement depends on the size of migration costs relative 
to the benefits from the amenity – a point to which we will return below. 
Beyond  the  theoretical  questions  of  identification  and  estimation,  numerical  estimates  of  the 
value of local public goods are of great practical interest.  Again consider the example of air quality, 
whose protection motivates a range of government policies that impose substantial costs on firms and 
consumers.  A  comprehensive  survey  of  cross-sectional  hedonic  property  value  studies  found  wide 
dispersion in estimated willingness to pay, with many instances of negligible or even negative estimates 
(Smith and Huang 1995).  If those low estimates are reliable, the costs of stringent air pollution regulation 
may outweigh the benefits.  On the other hand, evidence that such estimates understate the value of clean 
air would bolster the case for government policy. 
In this paper, we show how migration costs can be incorporated into a hedonic analysis.  We start 
by  incorporating  migration  into  the  canonical  wage-hedonic  model  proposed  by  Roback  (1982).    If 
moving is costly, then the sum of the derivatives of housing prices and wages with respect to the amenity 
– the standard hedonic measure of marginal willingness to pay – will no longer equal the implicit price of 
the amenity.  The more costly is migration relative to the marginal benefits of an improvement in the 
amenity, the greater will be the bias from ignoring migration costs in the analysis. 
To allow for costly mobility, we employ a different empirical strategy.  The starting point for our 
analysis is the household location decision, rather than the first order condition implied by a traditional 
hedonic model.  This approach allows us to incorporate migration costs (as the implicit disutility of 
moving various distances from one’s birth state) directly into the household optimization problem. 
We apply our method to the case of air quality – specifically, ambient concentrations of particular 
matter (“PM10”) in metropolitan areas throughout the U.S., for the years 1990 and 2000.  We study air 
pollution in general, and PM10 in particular, for a number of reasons.  First, an estimate of the economic 
value  of  improvements  in  air  quality  is  of  central  importance  to  the  U.S.  Environmental  Protection 
Agency  in  the  regulation  of  air  pollution  under  the  Clean  Air  Act  and  its  subsequent  amendments.  
Second, air  quality  improved  significantly  over the  decade  studied, providing  useful  panel  variation.  
Third, migration costs are likely to be large relative to the potential gains of changing locations for the 
sake of air quality; hence ignoring such costs is likely to produce substantial bias in estimates of WTP for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1 The study of the theory and identification of hedonic markets in competitive settings dates back to Rosen (1974).  The topic has 
recently seen a resurgence with methodological papers by Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2004), Heckman, Matzkin, and 
Nesheim (2005), and Bajari and Benkard (2001). 3 
 
air quality.
2    Fourth,  a  long  literature,  dating  back  to  Ridker  and  Henning  (1967)  and  Harrison  and 
Rubinfeld (1978), has used hedonic methods to value air quality (see Smith and Huang (1995) for a meta-
analysis).  Finally, particulate matter is a natural choice of pollutant: it is the standard measure of air 
pollution used in the literature, and an increasing body of evidence suggests that it is by far the most 
important local air pollutant in terms of health effects. 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two stages.  First, we use a discrete-choice model to infer the 
utility associated with living in various metropolitan areas.  We then regress these metro-area utilities on 
air pollution concentrations in order to recover the willingness to pay for air quality.  This second stage is 
analogous  to  the  traditional  hedonic  approach,  which  regresses  housing  prices  on  air  pollution.    An 
identification problem thus arises that is endemic to hedonic analyses.  As Chay and Greenstone (2005) 
point out, local air quality is likely to be correlated with unobserved local economic factors that also 
affect housing prices.  If so, naïve estimates of willingness to pay will be biased downward – helping to 
explain the low estimates reported in the existing literature. 
We employ a novel instrumental variables approach to deal with this endogeneity problem.  The 
intuition  behind  our  approach  is  simple.    Although  local  emissions  (correlated  with  local  economic 
activity) are the major determinant of local air quality, pollution also wafts in from distant sources.  The 
tall stacks of electric power plants spew particulate matter and other pollutants high into the atmosphere, 
where they travel great distances before affecting ground-level air quality.  Distant emissions, however, 
are likely to be uncorrelated with local economic activity – a conjecture that is confirmed by the data.  
Hence pollution from distant sources provides a natural instrument for local air pollution.  We compute 
this instrument using a detailed source-receptor matrix, developed for the U.S. EPA, that relates emissions 
from nearly 6,000 sources to particulate matter concentrations in each county in the U.S. 
Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for endogeneity and incorporating mobility 
costs.    As  a  preliminary  step,  we  estimate  a  traditional  wage-hedonic  model.    Instrumenting  for  air 
pollution greatly increases the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on particulate matter concentration 
in a regression of housing prices on local amenities.  The elasticity of housing prices with respect to air 
pollution estimated by instrumental variables is -0.50 to -0.63.  Income is essentially unaffected by air 
pollution.   Since housing accounts for approximately one-fifth of a household’s total expenditures, and 
the hedonic approach assumes that the entire value of local amenities is incorporated into housing prices 
and income, this estimate corresponds to an elasticity of total willingness to pay of -0.10 to -0.13. 
                                                       
2 As a likely contrast, consider the case of households sorting across school districts within a single MSA in response to changes 
in school quality.  Here we would expect that migration costs would be low, and that households would be highly motivated, 
leading to an expectation that the bias may be quite small. 4 
 
These  initial  results  provide  a  benchmark  for  assessing  the  results  of  our  residential  sorting 
model.  In line with intuition, the estimated value of clean air rises considerably when migration costs are 
taken into account.  In our full model, the elasticity of total willingness to pay with respect to air pollution 
is estimated to be between -0.34 and -0.43.  In dollar terms, these elasticities correspond to marginal 
willingness to pay between $149 and $185.  By comparison, the marginal willingness to pay estimated 
from the conventional hedonic model is $55.  In other words, the value of clean air implied by our 
residential sorting model is roughly three times greater than that found by applying the standard hedonic 
approach to the same data.  Importantly, we show that our parameter estimates are robust to a range of 
alternative specifications. 
These results suggest that migration costs are large enough (relative to the benefits from air 
quality) that only a third of the total economic value of the improvements in air quality over the 1990s 
was reflected in housing prices.  These results have important implications for policy, suggesting that the 
economic benefits of regulations that reduced particulate matter emissions are substantially larger than 
found in previous studies. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section demonstrates the difficulties 
that  mobility  costs  pose  for  the  standard  wage-hedonic  model,  and  then  develops  the  alternative 
econometric approach we use in this paper.  Section 3 describes the data we use to identify both models. 
Section 4 details our empirical specification, and Section 5 presents our results.  Section 6 concludes. 
2    Econometric models for valuing local amenities 
2.1  Incorporating mobility costs into the traditional hedonic model 
Consider the following variant of Roback's (1982) model, incorporating mobility costs. We present the 
simplest possible version of this model in order to demonstrate the basic intuition.  At the end of the 
section, we argue that extending the model to make it more realistic will only exacerbate the difficulties 
introduced by mobility costs. 
As  in  Roback's  model,  all  individuals  simultaneously  choose  their  location  along  with 
consumption of a composite commmodity C and a non-traded good (“housing”) H.  Each location j is 
characterized by a quantity Xj of a location-specific amenity (“air quality”).  In addition, there is a moving 
cost Mj associated with settling in city j.  Following Roback, we assume that individuals have identical 
preferences and abilities.  To keep the model as simple as possible, we suppose that all individuals are 
born in the  same  place,  and  that  moving  costs  are a  monotonic  function  of  the  amenity level.   For 
example, we might imagine that everyone is born in a central location, and that other cities are arranged in 
concentric rings with amenities improving as one moves outward.  While heroic, these assumptions are 
useful in conveying the basic intuition; we discuss the consequences of more general assumptions below. 5 
 
Each individual chooses her location j, along with consumption of C and H, to maximize her 
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where Ij  is income in location j; ρj is the price of housing in location j; and the price of the composite 
commodity is normalized to unity.  In equilibrium each individual must be indifferent among locations; if 
not, she would prefer to move. Hence indirect utility, denoted V, is constant: 
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The individual's problem is to trade off local amenities against wages and rents (which affect the 
budget  constraint  and  determine  the  individual’s  consumption  of  commodity  C).  Taking  the  total 
derivative  of  equation  (2)  and  using  Roy’s  Identity  to  substitute  for  I p V V H / − = ,  we  arrive  at  the 



















* is the marginal willingness to pay: more precisely, the change in income that would exactly 
compensate the individual for a marginal change in the amenity at her chosen location.  The first two 
terms on the right-hand side of equation (3) are the familiar terms from Roback’s analysis.  If mobility is 
costless (VM = 0), or mobility costs are constant (dM = 0), then the model is identical to Roback’s.  In 
those cases, the implicit price of the amenity X can be measured as the extra cost of housing minus the 
compensating wage increase. 
When mobility costs are positive and vary with location, the familiar equation no longer holds.  
Suppose that the amenity increases with distance from 0. In this case, VM  < 0 (since mobility is costly) 
and dM/dX > 0. Thus the true value of a marginal change in the amenity, given by p
*, is greater than the 
sum of the housing price and wage effects.  Intuitively, when it is more costly to move to locations with 
better amenities, the housing and labor markets will appear to undervalue those amenities: in order to 
induce anyone to move to the more attractive locales, rents must be lower (or wages higher) than they 
would in a world without mobility costs. 6 
 
Even  this  simple  model  poses  difficulties  for  empirical  analysis.    If  moving  costs  could  be 
directly observed, then dM/dX could be estimated much as the housing price (dρ/dX) and income (dI/dX) 
gradients are, and the implicit price p
* could be inferred.  But M is likely to be unobservable, since it 
represents the  disutility  of  moving  to  an  unfamiliar  place  far  from  home.    Moreover,  the  restrictive 
assumptions  we  have  made  so  far  amount  to  the  best  case  scenario  for  the  traditional  model.    For 
example, suppose that individuals are born in different locations.  Then the indifference condition (2) 
need no longer hold for all individuals in all locations, invalidating the total differential approach that 
determines the key marginal conditions given by equation (3).  Or suppose that mobility costs do not vary 
systematically with location; then there is no longer any reason to expect that the implicit price must be 
equal across locations, which is the central identifying assumption of the hedonic model.  We conclude 
that when mobility costs are likely to be significant, a different empirical strategy is necessary. 
 
2.2  A model of residential sorting 
To  surmount  these  difficulties,  we  develop  a  structural  approach  that  explicitly  models  the  location 
decision as taking place prior to the consumption of housing and the composite commodity. Essentially, 
we push the analysis back a step, examining the utility maximization problem in (1) rather than simply 
analyzing the equilibrium condition implicit in (3).  Estimation proceeds in two steps.  First, we specify a 
discrete-choice model of the household location decision.  Doing so allows us to estimate city-specific 
fixed effects that represent the composite utility of local attributes.  Second, we regress these estimated 
fixed effects on local amenities, using instrumental variables to correct for likely endogeneity. 
We  start  by  assuming  the  following  utility  function  for  individual  i  living  in  location  j  and 
consuming quantities Ci  and Hi  of the numeraire good and housing, respectively: 
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As  before,  Xj  denotes  the  local  amenity  of  interest  (here,  air  quality).    Mi,j  measures  the  long-run 
(dis)utility of migration associated with moving from i’s birth location to destination j.  This formulation 
is meant to capture mobility constraints, broadly defined.   Unobservable attributes of location j are 
captured in ξj .  Finally, ηi,j represents an individual-specific idiosyncratic component of utility that is 
assumed independent of mobility costs and city characteristics. 
Individuals maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint in equation (1).  Incorporating 


















Equation (5) states that housing expenditure accounts for a constant fraction of income, given by βH /(βH + 
βC ). For the sake of exposition, we assume that ρj (the price of housing services in location j) is known; in 
the empirical analysis we will estimate it from the data, as described in Section 4 below.  
Substituting for H
* in (4) and using the budget constraint yields the indirect utility function:   
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where  H C I β β β + ≡ .  Marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the amenity Xj equals the marginal rate 












= .  Note that while the 
coefficient on the amenity, βX, is constant across individuals, MWTP varies with income. 
The analysis so far assumes that income Ii,j is known for every individual in every region. In 
practice, of course, we must estimate what income would have been in regions not chosen.  Thus we 
decompose income into a predicted mean and an idiosyncratic error term: i.e.,  j i
I
j i j i I I , , , ˆ ε + = .  (In 
Section 4, we describe how we estimate income from the data.) Substituting this into equation (6) and 
taking logs yields: 
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θj  comprises  all  of  the  utility-relevant  attributes  of  location  j  that  are  constant  across  individuals.  
Meanwhile, υi,j is an error term that summarizes individual i’s idiosyncratic preferences for location j. 
Each individual chooses her location to maximize her utility. We assume that the idiosyncratic 
city preferences, i.e., the {υi,j}, are independently and identically distributed as type I extreme value.  This 
implies that the share of the population choosing to live in city j is given by a logit specification.  In 
practice, it is convenient to divide the right-hand side of equation (7) by βI, the marginal utility of income.  
Let tildes denote variables multiplied by 1/βI, e.g.,  I β θ θ /
~
= .  Hence the probability that individual I 
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The parameter  I β σ / 1 ≡  is a logit scaling parameter. We estimate equation (10) by maximum likelihood. 
We  recover  the  }
~
{θ   as  parameters  in the logit  estimation.   These city-specific fixed  effects 
represent  the  indirect  utility  (somewhat  loosely,  the  “quality  of  life”)  from  residing  in  each  city, 
independent of mobility costs or income.  In the second stage of estimation, we regress the estimated  }
~
{θ  
on local air pollution concentrations and other local amenities.  From equation (8), we have 
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MWTP β .  Thus the coefficient on ln Xj in equation (11) provides an estimate 
of the negative of the elasticity of willingness to pay with respect to air quality. 
 
2.3  Relationship between the two approaches 
The discrete-choice model just outlined is closely related to the Roback model.  In the latter setting, all 
individuals are identical (i.e., ηi,j ≡ 0) and indifferent among locations, hence V is constant.  Taking the 
total derivative of equation (6) and setting it equal to zero yields (after some algebra and treating ξj like 
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which is identical to equation (3).  Nonetheless, the identifying assumptions of the two models are very 
different.    The  Roback  model  uses  individuals’  indifference  among  locations  to  derive  the  result  in 
equation (13).  Since in that model individuals equate their marginal rate of substitution with the implicit 
amenity price, estimating the elements of (13) amounts to inferring the marginal willingness to pay. 
In contrast, our discrete-choice model relies on location decisions to reveal preferences about 
local amenities. In our model, individuals sort among locations on the basis of idiosyncratic tastes, and 
thus have strict preferences over location. If we are willing to assume that a city's appeal is a weighted 
sum of the city's characteristics, and that the weights are constant among individuals, then we can identify 
the underlying marginal willingness to pay directly from an equation such as (11).  These additional 
assumptions represent the cost of our approach.  The benefit is that it readily allows us to incorporate 
mobility  costs.  As  we  showed  above,  the  presence  of  mobility  costs  complicates  inference  in  the 
traditional hedonic model.  In the empirical analysis that follows, we confirm that allowing for mobility 
costs makes a large difference in the estimated value of clean air. 
Our discrete-choice model also highlights the question of how the size of a city should be used in 
inferring the value of local amenities.  City size plays only an indirect role (i.e., through equilibrium 
housing prices and incomes) in the conventional wage-hedonic model.  In contrast, our approach – by 
relying on residential location to reveal preferences – infers higher utility for places chosen by a larger 
share of individuals.  All else equal, bigger cities must have larger estimated values of  j θ
~
.  If big cities 
are big because of the observable amenities they offer, then the larger estimated city fixed effects convey 
useful information about how people value local attributes.  On the other hand, city size might enter into 
individuals’ utility directly (e.g., positively through agglomeration effects or negatively via congestion 
costs).  If city size is also correlated with local amenities (e.g., larger cities have more manufacturing 
facilities and thus poorer air quality), then omitting it will introduce bias.  Accordingly, in our empirical 
analysis we report results from specifications with and without population included as a covariate. 
 
2.4   Identification 
Two final econometric issues must be addressed in estimating equation the second stage of our model, 
given by equation (11).  First, the price of housing services, ρj, varies with observable characteristics of 10 
 
city j, and is likely correlated with unobserved local characteristics in ξj.  We solve this (minor) problem 
by moving  j H ρ β ln
~








β = , the share of 
income devoted to housing.  We set this parameter equal to its median value in our sample, which is 0.2.
3 
Second, amenity levels are likely correlated with local unobservable attributes. In our case of air 
quality, local economic activity is likely to be positively correlated with local air pollution as well as local 
rents and wages.  As a consequence, naïve estimation of equation (11) by OLS is likely to yield biased 
parameter estimates.  To address this potential source of bias, previous research has attempted to isolate a 
component of air pollution that is orthogonal to economic activity.  In a recent paper, for example, Chay 
and Greenstone (2005) use discontinuities implicit in the Clean Air Act to isolate a source of pseudo-
random variation in regulatory intensity across similar locations. 
Following  Chay  and  Greenstone,  we  combine  two  strategies  to  deal  with  this  potential 
correlation.  First, we estimate equation (11) in first differences, using panel data from 1990 and 2000: 
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where, for example,  1990 2000
~ ~ ~
θ θ θ − ≡ j ∆ ; and  j ζ
~
 is the time varying component of the unobservable  j ξ
~ .  
Note  that  we  have  moved  j H ρ β ln
~
∆   to  the  left-hand  side  of  the  regression  equation.  Taking  first 
differences  eliminates  any  bias  due  to  correlation  between  persistent  air  pollution  and  permanent 
unobserved  city  characteristics  –  for  example,  a  concentration  of  highly  polluting  manufacturing 
industries, or perennial traffic congestion.  However, one might still worry about potential correlation 
between  j ζ
~
 and ∆Xj.
4  Hence we also need to find an instrument for air pollution. 
We develop a novel instrument that exploits the geography of particulate matter formation and 
transmission.  Pollution travels long distances: particulates emitted from Midwestern power plants, for 
example, contribute substantially to air pollution in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic.  At the same time, 
such emissions are likely to be uncorrelated with housing prices or local economic activity.  Drawing on 
this  intuition,  we  instrument  for  changes  in  local  air  pollution  using  changes  in  particulate  matter 
                                                       
3 The estimate of 0.2 corresponds to the share of income spent on housing in our sample of individuals in the microcensus data, 
using a 30-year fixed mortgage rate of 9%, which is the average of the values in 1990 and 2000.  In our empirical analysis, we 
show that our results are robust to other choices of this parameter. 
4 Suppose, for example, that 
j ζ
~  includes the effects of an economic recession in location j.  If reduced economic activity is 
correlated with reductions in PM pollution from reduced economic activity, the estimate of  X β
~  may be biased upward 11 
 
originating from distant sources.  In particular, for the years 1990 and 1999, we compute the particulate 
matter in location j that is attributable to all sources located at least 80 kilometers from that location, and 
use the difference between the two measures as our instrument for the change in air pollution.  We 
describe the construction of the instrument in detail in Section 3.  The key step is the use of a county-to-
county source-receptor (S-R) matrix developed for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  This 
matrix relates emissions from nearly 6,000 sources throughout the U.S. to pollution concentrations in the 
3,080 receptor counties.  By excluding sources within a chosen radius, we can construct a measure of the 
pollution concentration for a given city that is attributable to distant sources. 
Figure 1 illustrates our instrumenting strategy.  The figure depicts the computed contributions of 
emissions from counties more than 80 kilometers away to local air quality in the Raleigh-Durham (NC) 
MSA.  Darker shading represents source counties with greater contributions to the ambient concentration 
of particulate matter.  Because the prevailing winds in the United States blow from west to east, the 
greatest sources of pollution are counties to the west of Raleigh-Durham.  As might be expected, two 
urban counties in North Carolina contribute the most pollution: Mecklenburg County to the southwest 
(whose seat is the city of Charlotte) and Forsyth County to the west (Winston-Salem).  However, the third 
most significant contributor to ambient particulate matter concentrations in the Raleigh area is nearly 800 
km  away  in  western  Tennessee:  the  enormous  coal-fired  Johnsonville  power  plant  operated  by  the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. 
3  Data 
3.1   Primary data sources 
The data used for this analysis come from several sources, all publicly available.  For the discrete choice 
model of residential location decisions, as well as the regressions used to estimate individual income and 
the price of housing services at the MSA level, we draw on the one and five percent micro data samples 
of the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Population Censuses, respectively.  The census data describe attributes of the 
household head along with the household’s composition.  The data set we use for our analysis consists of 
random samples of 10,000 household heads in each year who are under the age of 35 and reside in one of 
242 metropolitan statistical areas.  We treat the household head as the decision-maker, and focus on 
his/her attributes, along with those of the dwelling in which the household resides.  Migration variables 
are calculated from data describing the household’s state of birth and the location of each MSA.  We 
exclude household heads over 35 years old to ensure that location decisions are driven by current local 
attributes.   The 242  MSAs  that  comprise  our  choice  set include  the  larger  U.S.  cities,  and contains 
approximately 86 percent of the total U.S. metropolitan population in both 1990 and 2000.  Appendix 
Table A1 describes the key census variables used in the analysis. 12 
 
To  estimate  willingness  to  pay  for  air  quality,  we  require  data  on  pollution,  local  economic 
activity, and a range of local amenities.  We describe the construction of our air pollution measures and 
instruments  in  detail  below.    Information  on  income,  population,  and  employment  comes  from  the 
Regional Economic Information System database maintained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Data 
on other local amenities are taken from various editions of the County and City Data Book and the Places 
Rated Almanac (Savageau and Boyer 1993; Savageau and D’Agostino 2000).
5  Table 2 presents summary 
statistics and a full description of the variables used in the analysis. 
 
3.2   Air quality measures 
Our measure of air pollution is the ambient concentration of particulate matter.
6  Particulate matter refers 
to airborne small particles, fine solids, and aerosols that form as a result of activities as diverse as the 
fossil fuel combustion, mining, agriculture, construction and demolition, and driving on unpaved roads.  
While most of the particles resulting from these processes are relatively large in size (i.e., approximately 
1/7
th the diameter of a human hair), smaller particles result from chemical processes that occur when 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organics react with other compounds in the atmosphere.  The 
result is an array of pollutants, collectively known as “PM10” (because they are all smaller than 10 
micrometers in size), that carry with them serious health consequences.
7 
                                                       
5 Data from the REIS and CCDB are at the county level.  We  aggregate up to the metro-area  level using the same MSA 
definitions as we use in the pollution data (based on MSA designations in 1990).  Doing so ensures that our definitions of MSAs 
remain constant in both years, even as the official Census designations changed. 
6 In an ideal world, we would estimate our model on other measures of ambient air pollution as well, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
or  ground-level  ozone  (O3).    However,  we  are  unaware  of  any  fine-grained  source-receptor  matrix  for  other  pollutants 
comparable to the PM10 S-R matrix we use here.  This prevents us from implementing our instrumental variables strategy for 
other pollutants; our empirical results confirm the importance of doing so.  A consolation is that PM10 is far and away the most 
important air pollutant in terms of human health effects.  Moreover, it is the pollutant that has been most commonly studied in the 
previous literature (albeit under its previous guise of “Total Suspended Particulates,” or TSP.)  Finally, to the extent that PM10 
concentrations are correlated with other important pollutants, our results will apply more broadly.  Such correlation is probably 
more likely for SO2 (which results from similar anthropogenic processes and transported similar distances) than for O3, whose 
creation depends on poorly understood interactions between manmade NOx emissions and biogenic volatile organic compounds. 
7 Beginning with the Harvard Six City Study (Dockery et al., 1993), thousands of analyses have found serious health effects from 
atmospheric particulate matter.  These are most severe for the young and the elderly – especially those suffering from asthma 
(Lin et al., 2002; Norris et al., 1999; Slaughter et al., 2003; Tolbert et al., 2000).  Fine particles have been shown to enter the 
bloodstream, increasing the risk of heart attacks and strokes (Hong et al., 2002; Tsai et al., 2003; D’Ippoliti et al., 2003).  Studies 
have also found evidence of lung tissue inflammation (Ghio et al., 2000), reduced lung function in children (Gauderman et al., 
2002), increased risk of lung cancer (Pope et al., 2002), and even the possibility of heritable diseases (Samet et al., 2004).   13 
 
We estimate ambient pollution concentrations for each MSA in 1990 and 1999 using data on 
emissions of particulates and sulfur dioxide (a precursor to PM10).
8  The data are taken from the National 
Emissions Inventory maintained by the EPA.  To translate emissions into concentrations of particulate 
matter, we use the PM10 module of the Source-Receptor (S-R) Matrix Model, described in Latimer 
(1996) and Abt (2000).
9  This model, used by EPA and its contractors to estimate the health effects of 
particulate emissions, draws on an atmospheric model called the Climatological Regional Dispersion 
Model (CRDM).  The great advantage of this S-R matrix is its fine-grained resolution: it is a source-to-
county matrix of transfer coefficients, where cell (s,r) contains the transfer coefficient relating emissions 
of  a particular pollutant in source county s to PM10 concentrations in receptor county r.  The full matrix 
for each pollutant includes a transfer coefficients from 5903 sources to 3080 receptor counties.  The 
coefficients account for “area sources” in each of 3080 counties (stationary sources of pollution too small 
to be individually identified – e.g., construction sites); 565 individually identified major point sources 
(e.g., tall stacks at electric power plants); and miscellaneous smaller point sources grouped at the county 
level in 2228 counties (e.g., shorter stacks at manufacturing facilities). 
With these matrices in hand, generating estimated PM10 concentrations in each county for each 
year is simply a matter of matrix algebra.  Let St
PM and St
SO2 denote the (1 x 5903) vectors of emissions of 
particular matter and sulfur dioxide, respectively, from all sources in year t; and let Γ
PM and Γ
SO2 denote 
the corresponding S-R matrices.  Then the estimated vector of county-level PM10 concentrations in year t 




SO2 .   We calculate the metro-area concentration by averaging across the 
constituent counties in each MSA.  These computed concentrations provide our measures of air pollution 
in a given location in a given year.  They represent average ambient concentrations of particulate matter 
throughout the year, based on actual emissions and prevailing meteorological patterns.
10 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate our pollution data, depicting computed PM10 concentrations in 1999 for 
each of the 242 MSAs in our data.  Darker shadings correspond to greater concentrations of particulate 
matter.  The western and eastern United States are depicted separately, but the same shading gradient is 
used.  Note that ambient concentrations of particulates generally increase from west to east, mirroring the 
                                                       
8 We use data for 1999 rather than 2000 because the National Emissions Inventory is collected at three-year intervals. 
9 We thank Wayne Gray and his co-authors for generously sharing the S-R matrix with us.  The discussion of the matrix is based 
in part on the discussion in Shadbegian, Gray, and Morgan (2004). 
10 We use the predicted measures for two reasons: first, they do not depend on the placement of particular air monitors or 
idiosyncratic  weather  events  and  wind  patters;  second,  they  lend  themselves  well  to  our  instrumental  variables  strategy.  
Importantly, our computed measures of air quality are positively correlated with EPA data based on air quality monitors, with 
correlations significantly different from zero at p < 0.001. 14 
 
underlying weather patterns.  Thus the cities of the West Coast have relatively low levels of particulates 
on the whole, while the nation’s highest concentrations occur in Atlanta and New York. 
 
3.3   Instrumental variables approach 
To create our instruments, only a slight twist is needed.  First, we calculate distances from the center of 
each source county (or the actual location of point sources) to the center of each receptor county.
11  Given 






SO2 , where ΓD
PM  (for example) is the S-R 
matrix for particulate emissions, with the transfer coefficient in cell (s,r) replaced by a zero if the distance 
from source s to county r is less than D.  In the empirical analysis, we use a distance of D = 80 km (50 
miles).  Since the regressor is the change in the natural logarithm of PM10 concentrations (i.e., ∆lnPM), 
we  use  as  the  basis  for  our  instrument  the  corresponding  change  in  the  estimated  logarithm  of  the 





80 PM PM PM ∆ . 
The  validity  of  this  approach  depends  on  the  orthogonality  of  distant  pollution  and  local 
economic activity.  One potential concern in this context might be regional variation in how distant U.S. 
sources affect local air pollution.  Because prevailing winds blow from west to east, the contribution of 
distant sources to local air pollution increases in the same direction.  For example, the relative importance 
of distant sources is likely to be very different in Syracuse than in San Diego.  If cities in a given region 
also experience common economic shocks, our instrument may fail the exclusion restriction.  To solve 
this problem, we take two important steps.  First, we condition the full analysis on a set of nine Census 
regional dummies.  Second, in creating our instruments, we interact our estimates of “distant pollution” – 
i.e., the vector ∆lnPM
80 – with dummy variables for the nine census regions used in the analysis.  Thus 
our instrument for ∆PM is  R × ≡
80 80 PM PM ∆ ∆ R , where R is a  9 × J  matrix with cell R(j,r) equal to 1 if 
city j is in region r, and zero otherwise.  This approach is a conservative one.  Having conditioned on 
region,  our  model  must  identify  the  effects  of  air  pollution  entirely  off  of  intra-regional  effects.  
Moreover, as we show in the empirical analysis, our results are robust to using the “unconditional” 
instrument – that is, the measure of distant air pollution alone, without regional interactions. 
Table 3 presents evidence supporting our instrumenting strategy.  The table reports correlations 
between three measures of air pollution and observable characteristics at the metro-area level.  We present 
three measures of pollution: estimated pollution from all sources (i.e., PM); the estimated contribution to 
air pollution from sources greater than 50 km distant (i.e.,  PM
50); and the estimated contribution from 
sources greater than 80 km distant (i.e., PM
80).  Note that the first of these is our measure of ambient air 
                                                       
11 For MSAs with multiple counties, we apply the distance exclusion for each source uniformly for all counties within the MSA, 
based on the distance of the nearest county in the MSA to the particular source. 15 
 
quality, while the third is the basis of our instrument.  We consider correlations between these measures 
of air quality and local economic activity, as measured by the number of manufacturing establishments, 
total employment, and total income.  We report correlations for the years 1990 and 1999, and for the 
change between those years.  For our instruments, we report correlations with and without conditioning 
on the census region.  Numbers in boldface are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
  The  first  column  of  the  table  shows  correlations  between  local  economic  activity  and  the 
computed  MSA  PM10  concentration.    Local  pollution  and  local  economic  activity  are  strongly  and 
positively correlated in the levels.  This confirms the intuition that a naïve regression of housing prices (or 
city fixed effects) on local air quality is likely to yield biased results.  Note that we find a strong but 
negative correlation in the differences, for total employment and income.  This result is driven by falling 
PM10 concentrations and growing economic activity in four of the largest cities in the U.S. (New York, 
Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston). 
The cells in the next four columns and the bottom set of rows report correlations between local 
economic activity and variations on our instrument.  As shown in the far right-hand column, our primary 
instrument  (based  on  pollution  from  sources  more  than  80km  away  and  conditional  on  region)  is 
essentially uncorrelated with manufacturing establishments, employment, or income.  These near-zero 
correlations suggests that the portion of PM10 concentration due to sources outside 80km is uncorrelated 
with local economic activity and thus is a reasonable instrument.  The correlations are somewhat larger 
(but still insignificant) for the less restrictive instrument that excludes sources within 50 kilometers. 
Table 3 illustrates as well the importance of conditioning the analysis on regional dummies; 
compare the correlations in columns (4) (without regional controls) and (5) (with regional controls).  Of 
course,  the  ultimate  source  of  concern  is  the  correlation  between  our  instrument  and  unobservable 
characteristics of metropolitan regions.  Nonetheless, Table 3 provides as much support for our approach 
as observable data might be expected to provide. 
4  Econometric specification 
Several steps are needed to implement the residential sorting model outlined in Section 2.  First, we must 
estimate housing prices and incomes in each location.  Next, we must choose a representation of mobility 
costs.    We  can then  use a  logit  model  of  location choice  to  estimate the  city-specific  fixed effects.  
Finally, we regress those fixed effects on local attributes.  We discuss the details of each step in turn.  
Throughout this analysis, we use i to index households, j to index locations (MSAs), and t to index the 
year (1990 or 2000).  We will often pool data from both years.  Note that while the set of metropolitan 
areas is the same in each year, the set of households is not. 16 
 
One approach to housing prices would be to take an aggregate measure of housing prices – for 
example, the median value of a home in each MSA.  However, such an approach raises potentially serious 
problems of aggregation bias.  In particular, home values might rise because of unobserved changes in the 
quality of the housing stock, rather than changes in local amenities.  If these changes in housing supply 
are correlated with local amenities, an endogeneity problem arises.
12 
We employ a different approach that takes explicit account of the characteristics of individual 
homes.  Let Pi,j,t denote the value of the home owned by household i in location j appearing in year t, 
which we define as the value of the house (for owner-occupied housing) or monthly rent (for rental units).  
We model Pi,j,t as a function of the characteristics of the dwelling, given by a vector hi,t, and a scaling 
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Ωi,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if household i owns its home and 0 otherwise; thus λj,t measures the 
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Along with housing characteristics, the parameters φt yield an index of “housing services” each period, 
defined as  ) exp( , , t t t i H φ hi = .  Hence the parameter ρj,t measures the effective “price of housing services” 
in a particular location and a particular year.  Because we control for the bundle of housing services, these 
prices provide a consistent measure of the true price of housing across metropolitan areas with different 
housing stocks.  We can readily estimate these prices as the MSA and time specific intercepts in a 
regression of equation (16), using the census microdata described in Section 3. 
Next, consider income.  We do not observe the income that a given individual would earn in 
every location, but only what he earns in his chosen city.  In the micro-data used for estimation, however, 
household heads with similar characteristics are scattered among locations.  Hence we can impute the 
income  each  individual  would  earn  in  every  location  by  estimating  a  series  of  location-specific 
regressions of incomes on a set of individual attributes: 
                                                       
12 Chay and Greenstone (2005) use median home prices at the county level as their dependent variables in hedonic estimation, 
controlling for the potential bias by including a range of county-level characteristics of the housing market.  As they argue, their 
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and measures the observed percentage of individuals with education level ED, born in region RB, that are 
found to be living in region RD.  This correction therefore requires that our data include individuals of 
each education type migrating from every region to every region – a condition that is satisfied in the 
census data for our nine-by-nine regional grid.  We estimate the income equation (17) using the census 
microdata.  We use the results to generate predicted income  t j i I , , ˆ .
13 
Next, consider mobility costs.  Table 1 suggests that households tend to settle close to where the 






, , 1 , , , , , ,
~ ~ ~ ) ; (
~ R
t j i R
R
t j i R
S
t j i S t j i M t j i d d d f M µ µ µ + + = ≡ µ d  
 
where di j t
S
, , = 1 if location j is outside individual i’s birth state ( = 0 otherwise), di j t
R
, ,
1 1 =  if location j is 
outside individual i’s birth region as defined in Table 1 ( = 0 otherwise), and  di j t
R
, ,
2 1 =  if location j is 
outside individual i’s macro-region ( = 0 otherwise).
14  We normalize migration costs to zero if the 
household head does not leave his birth state. 
We now turn to estimation of the parameter vector  }
~
, , ~ , ~ , ~ { 2 1 θ σ µ µ µ R R S .  On the assumption that 
preferences are stable over time, we can estimate a single set of behavioral parameters (the mobility 
                                                       
13  Note that, in fitting 
t k j I , , ˆ , one omits the Dahl correction terms described in the next paragraph of the text.  These serve only to 
give the error in equation (15) the needed properties for unbiased OLS estimation. 
14 There are four macro-regions defined by the U. S. Census Bureau: (1) Northeast, (2) Midwest, (3) South, (4) West.  18 
 
parameters in µ and the scaling parameter σ) for both years 1990 and 2000.  We do this by pooling the 
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where χi,j,t is an indicator function that equals one if household i observed in year t chooses location j, and 
zero otherwise.
15,16 
Recall that the  }
~
{ ,t j θ  represent composite city-level attributes.  Let PMj,t denote the air pollution 
(PM10) concentration in location j and period t, computed as described in Section 3.  Note that higher 
values of PMj,t correspond to worse air quality, so that  0
~
< PM β  if individuals are willing to pay for better 
air quality.  Let Zj,t denote a vector of other observable city attributes.  The equation to be estimated in the 
second stage is thus (updating equation (14)) 
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We estimate equation (21) by instrumental variables, using   
80
, ln j R PM ∆  as our instrument for  j PM ln ∆ .  
The  covariates  in  Zj,t  include  a  range  of  local  characteristics  of  metropolitan  areas,  including  local 
economic activity, crime, local government tax and expenditure data, and rankings of MSAs in various 
categories of quality of life such as health care provision, arts, and transportation infrastructure. 
5  Estimation Results 
5.1  Housing price and income regressions 
Results from the housing price regressions described in equation (16) are reported in Table A2 for each 
year.  Results are as expected.  Bigger, newer houses yield more housing services, as do houses on larger 
plots and with complete kitchen and plumbing facilities.  An inspection of the most and least expensive 
                                                       
15 In practice, when the choice set is large (as it is in our application), estimating the full vector θ
~ by maximum likelihood can be 
computationally prohibitive.  Berry (1994) provides a computational algorithm whereby these values are imputed indirectly.   19 
 
cities in the U.S. in terms of the price of housing services corresponds to conventional wisdom.  The 
average price of housing services (in logs) rises from 3.72 in 1990 to 4.48 in 2000, while the premium on 
owned housing rises from 5.27 to 5.41.  All estimates are statistically significant at the usual levels. 
Table  A3  summarizes  the  results  from  the  MSA-specific  income  regressions  described  in 
equation (17).  Men earn more than women; whites earn more than minorities; and income increases with 
education.  Income falls significantly for those over age 60, reflecting retirement patterns.  The premiums 
for white and male, along with the age penalty, all diminish between 1990 and 2000.  In the case of the 
age penalty, this fall may reflect growing participation in the labor market after age 60.  Over the same 
time period, the premium for college education rises, while that for a high school diploma falls. 
 
5.2  Estimates from the conventional model 
As a benchmark for comparison with our residential sorting model, we estimate a conventional hedonic 
model without mobility costs.  We estimate the model with and without instruments for air pollution, as a 
preliminary assessment of the severity of the bias and the success of our instrumenting strategy. 
Recall that in the conventional model with costless migration, the implicit price of local amenities 
– and hence marginal willingness to pay – can be estimated as the sum of the housing price and income 
gradients with respect to a given amenity.  Accordingly, we regress the log of per capita income in MSA j 
(denoted Yj) and the price of housing services ρj (the MSA-specific intercept from the housing price 
regressions)  on  particulate  matter  concentrations  PMj    and  the  matrix  of  regional  dummies  R.    We 
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Table  4  reports  OLS  and  IV  estimates  of  the  coefficients  on  PM10  concentrations,  i.e.,  Y PM, γ   and 
ρ γ , PM .
17  Both OLS estimates are negative and significantly different from zero.  Taken at face value, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
16 Note that there is an arbitrary normalization of one of the 
t j,
~
θ  values: raising the utility of all locations by a constant amount 
leaves location decisions unchanged.  We set 
t j,
~
θ  equal to zero for the Houston, TX MSA. 
17 For the housing price regression, the covariates in the specifications reported in columns (2) and (4) are the same as in the main 
results from the residential sorting model (refer to Table 6).  For the income regression, the employment rate and number of 
manufacturing establishments are omitted because they are simultaneously determined with wages and salaries.  20 
 
these coefficients imply that both housing prices and wages rise when air quality improves.  The former 
effect is consistent with expectations, but not the latter. 
The effects of instrumenting for air pollution suggest that the OLS estimates are indeed biased.  
The estimated elasticity of housing prices with respect to air pollution more than doubles in magnitude, 
going  from  -0.30  in  the OLS  regression to  -0.63  in  the  IV  estimates.    Meanwhile,  the  effect of  air 
pollution on per capita income vanishes. We ignore the results from the income equation in computing 
MWTP.
18  This is a conservative approach: since the estimates are negative, excluding them inflates the 
estimates of MWTP from the conventional model.  This closes the gap between those estimates and those 
from our discrete choice model below, leading us to understate the importance of migration costs. 
 
5.3  Estimates from the residential sorting model 
Table 5 reports parameter estimates from the first-stage residential choice equation (20).  Estimates are 
highly statistically significant and have the expected signs.  There is a significant utility cost (-4.31) 
associated with leaving one’s birth state.  Costs continue to rise with leaving one’s birth region and 
macro-region, but at a declining rate (i.e., -5.58 and -6.46, respectively). The estimate of the scaling 
parameter σ is 0.67.  The results of primary interest from the first stage, of course, are the MSA-level 
fixed effects.  These are summarized in Table 2, but can be illustrated by some examples.  Controlling for 
population, the three least attractive metropolitan areas in the year 2000 (those with the most negative 
values of  j θ
~
) were New Bedford, MA; Danbury, CT; and Detroit, MI.  Cities near the median included 
Memphis, TN (#116 out of 242) and Hartford, CT (#125).    Portland, OR and Providence, RI ranked 
among the top five.
19 
These estimated MSA-level fixed effects are used as the dependent variables in the second-stage 
estimation of equation (21).  Table 6 reports results for a range of specifications.  Columns (1) and (2) 
present OLS estimates; columns (3)-(5) report results from instrumental variables estimation.  To account 
for the potential role played by city size, we include the logarithm of population as a covariate in the 
specifications reported in columns (2) and (5). 
The  estimated  coefficients  on  ∆ln(PM)  are  presented  in  the  first  row  of  the  table.    These 
coefficients  represent  the  elasticity  of  willingness  to  pay  (WTP)  with  respect  to  air  pollution 
concentrations.    As  in  the  housing  price  regressions  (Table  4),  OLS  yields  statistically  significant 
                                                       
18 Chay and Greenstone (2005) report a similar finding, and likewise ignore the income estimates in computing MWTP. 
19  In  the  raw  rankings,  city  size  makes  a  big  difference,  as  we  discussed  above    in  Section  2.3.    Without  controlling  for 
population, the cities with the highest estimates of 
t j,
~
θ  are Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York.  Of course, controlling for 
population has a much smaller effect on the change from 1990 to 2000. 21 
 
estimates with the expected sign.  Once again, a comparison with the IV results reveals strong evidence of 
endogeneity  bias.    When  we  instrument  for  air  pollution,  the  estimated  elasticity  nearly  triples  in 
magnitude: the OLS estimates are -0.13 to -0.16, while the IV estimates range from -0.34 to -0.42. 
Note that these WTP elasticities are not directly comparable to the elasticities of housing prices 
reported in Table 4.  The estimates from the conventional model represent the percent change in housing 
expenditures associated with a one percent change in air pollution.  In contrast, the elasticities estimated 
by the residential sorting model incorporate not only changes in housing prices, but also foregone income 
and the disutility from moving.  Thus the relative magnitudes of the raw parameter estimates in the 
conventional model are misleading; in dollar terms, as we shall see below, the results from the residential 
sorting model are more than three times as large as the results from the conventional approach.  Hence 
including mobility costs matters greatly for our estimates. 
For some perspective on what these estimates imply, consider a concrete example.  In 1990, the 
computed PM10 concentration in the New Haven-Meriden MSA was 62.2 µg/m
3.  In the same year, the 
computed PM10 concentration in the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill MSA was 44.0 µg/m
3 – roughly 30% 
lower than in New Haven, or almost exactly one standard deviation away.  (The standard deviation of 
PM10  in the sample is 18.8 is µg/m
3.)  The estimated elasticity in the full specification is -0.34 (Table 6, 
column  5),  implying  that  the  increase  in  air  quality  moving  from  New  Haven  to  Durham  would 
correspond to increase in willingness to pay of 10%.  Per-capita income in 1990 in New Haven was 
$23,558 (in current dollars).  Hence the air quality benefits of moving from New Haven to Durham were 
worth roughly $2,360 in foregone consumption. 
The estimated coefficients on other local amenities included in the regressions (the covariates in 
Zj) vary in significance, but most have the expected signs in the IV estimates.  Metropolitan areas with 
higher government expenditure per capita are significantly more appealing; the fraction of revenue raised 
by property taxes also has a positive effect.  Areas with better health care attract more residents; note that 
a positive value for ∆(Health ranking) corresponds to a worsening of health care (and likewise for the arts 
and transport variables).  Culture and transportation are also valued, although the estimates are imprecise.  
In  the  specification  of  column  (4),  the  size  of  the  local  economy  (as  measured  by  manufacturing 
establishments) is positively and significantly correlated with the appeal of an area, but the effect vanishes 
when population is included (the two variables are strongly correlated).  Our other measure of local 
economic activity (i.e., employment as a fraction of the total population) turns out to be insignificant. 
Importantly, the inclusion of metropolitan area characteristics in general has only a small effect on the 
estimated  coefficient  on  ∆lnPM.    This  robustness  provides  additional  support  for  our  instrumental 
variables strategy.  Finally, the coefficient on population is highly significant, in line with expectations.  22 
 
Controlling for population reduces the magnitude of the estimated impact of air quality by just under 
20%.  Thus the specifications with and without population define the range of willingness to pay. 
The coefficients on these covariates allow the computation of elasticities with respect to local 
amenities other than air quality.  For example, the median value of the health care ranking (across both 
years) is 145.5.  Thus the estimated coefficient of -0.001 on ∆(Health) from the full specification implies 
that  a  one  percent  increase  in  a  city’s  health  care  ranking  translated  into  a  0.15%  increase  in  its 
attractiveness, as measured by willingness to pay.  Similarly, the elasticity of willingness to pay with 
respect to government spending (at the sample median of 1.34, in thousands of dollars) is 0.23.  By 
comparison, the WTP elasticity with respect to air quality is larger but of the same general magnitude.  
Alternatively, we can estimate the percentage increase in willingness to pay that resulted from the median 
change  in  local  amenities  in  the  data.    For  government  expenditures,  the  median  change  was  0.22, 
corresponding to a 4% increase in WTP.  The median change in PM concentration was a reduction of 5.7 
µg/m
3 – which translates into a 5% increase in WTP.  Thus the median improvement in air quality was 
comparable, in quality-of-life terms, to the median increase in per-capita government expenditure. 
 Table  7  presents  estimated  WTP  elasticities  from  a  range  of  other  empirical  specifications.  
Panels (b) and (c) represent variation in the dependent variable: in particular, they assume a higher or 
lower share of expenditures devoted to housing.  The results change very little.  The parameter estimates 
are also robust to the precise design of the instrument.  The results are very close to the base case when 
we employ the unconditional instrument (i.e., ∆lnPM
80, without regional interactions; see panel (d)).  The 
parameter estimates are slightly smaller when we use a less restrictive exclusion distance of 50 kilometers 
in constructing the instrument (i.e., ∆lnPM
50; see panel (e)).  Indeed, this is exactly as we should expect, 
since the smaller exclusion distance renders the instrument and the regressor more alike. 
Finally, consider the choice of functional form.  In the bottom panel of the table, we report results 
when the change in PM10 concentration enters linearly (rather than in logs).  The main effect is to 
amplify  the  importance  of  the  covariates.    Without  controlling  for  MSA  characteristics  and  other 
amenities, the estimated elasticity is close to that in the corresponding base specification.  With covariates 
included,  however,  the  log-linear  specification  yields  a  much  higher  estimated  elasticity.    This  is 
presumably  explained  by  the  greater  weight  that  the  log-linear  specification  gives  to  outliers  –  in 
particular, to a handful of large cities that experienced large drops in computed PM10 concentrations. 
Based  on  the  evidence  presented  in  Table  7,  we  conclude  that  our  base  specification  is  a 
reasonable one, and that our conclusions are robust to the choice of empirical strategy in the second stage. 
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5.4  Marginal willingness to pay 
In our residential sorting model,  PM β
~
 measures the elasticity of willingness to pay with respect to PM10 
concentrations; thus we can recover an estimate of marginal willingness to pay for air quality, in dollar 
terms, by multiplying  PM β
~
−  by household income and dividing by the PM10 concentration. To calculate 
a comparable MWTP for the conventional wage-hedonic model, we must first account for the share of 
expenditure  in  housing.    Since  the  wage-hedonic  model  ignores  mobility  costs,  it  assumes  that 
individuals’  entire  willingness  to  pay  is  captured  in  housing  prices  and  incomes.    To  translate  the 
estimates  of  housing  price  elasticities  into  willingness  to  pay,  therefore,  we  must  first  multiply  the 
coefficients  from  the  conventional  hedonic  model  by  the  share  of  income  devoted  to  housing 
expenditures, or 0.2.  Multiplying the resulting elasticity of willingness to pay by income, and dividing by 
the PM10 concentration, yields estimated MWTP, just as in the residential sorting model.
20 
  Table 8 reports the results of these computations, using the median values of household income 
($15,679) and PM10 concentration (36.0) in our sample as our measures of income and air pollution, 
respectively.  Thus the reported figures for MWTP represent the median household’s willingness to pay 
for a 1 µg/m
3 reduction in ambient PM10 concentrations, expressed in constant 1982-1984 dollars.
21  For 
reference, we have also included the elasticities estimated from the regressions (expressed in terms of air 
quality rather than air pollution). 
  The  results  provide  striking  evidence  of  the  importance  of  accounting  for  endogeneity  and 
mobility costs.  When we instrument for air pollution in the full model, the estimated MWTP more than 
doubles, increasing from $69 to $149.  Incorporating mobility costs matters even more.  The marginal 
willingness to pay estimated by our residential sorting model is much larger than the comparable estimate 
from the conventional hedonic model: MWTP increases from $55 to $149 in comparable specifications 
(compare columns (3) and (4) of Table 8).  We also present MWTP for the IV specifications with other 
sets of covariates (columns (3) and (4) in Table 6).  The estimated elasticity of 0.38 from the specification 
without  MSA  covariates  implies  a  MWTP  of  $165.  When  local  attributes  other  than  population  are 
included, estimated MWTP rises to $185.  
                                                       
20 An alternative approach, more directly in line with theory (see, e.g., eqn (3)) is to calculate MWTP for the conventional model 
by multiplying the estimated coefficients in Table 4 by the price of housing divided by PM10 concentration (to recover an 
estimate of the derivative of housing prices with respect to air pollution) and then multiply by the bundle of housing services, H
*.  
Of course, this amounts to essentially the same thing; and when we carry out those calculations, using median values, we get 
nearly identical estimates of WTP.  
21 Measurement in 1982-1984 dollars facilitates comparison with the numbers reported by Smith and Huang (1995) and Chay and 
Greenstone (2005). 24 
 
Thus a broad statement of our results is that we find an estimated MWTP for air quality ranging 
from $149 to $185, in constant 1982-1984 dollars, for a household whose head earns the median income 
of $15,679.  These estimates are large relative to the previous hedonics literature.  Chay and Greenstone 
(2005), for example, report an elasticity of housing prices with respect to particulate matter concentrations 
of -0.20 to -0.35 – half as large as our conventional hedonic estimates, and roughly one-sixth the size of 
the elasticities estimated by our residential sorting model. 
The discrepancy is even larger in dollar values.  Our model identifies marginal willingness to pay 
in  terms  of  foregone  consumption  of  housing  services  and  other  goods.    As  a  result,  our  estimates 
correspond to annual marginal willingness to pay – equivalently, the willingness to pay for a one-unit 
improvement in air quality that lasts for one year.  The comparable estimates in Chay and Greenstone 
correspond to a marginal willingness to pay of $22 for a reduction in PM10 concentrations – one-seventh 
the size of our lower estimate.
22   Moreover, the estimates by Chay and Greenstone were themselves much 
larger than the previous literature.  Part of the discrepancy between their estimates and our estimates 
using the conventional hedonic approach can be explained by rising willingness to pay between the 1970s 
and  1990s  due  to  rising  incomes;  Smith  and  Huang  (1995)  report  finding  such  an  effect  in  their 
comparative analysis of the previous literature. Moreover, our MWTP estimates likely capture the effects 
of other pollutants whose concentrations are correlated with PM10. 
The internal comparison between our estimates from the wage-hedonic model and the residential 
sorting model remains striking.  Incorporating mobility costs yields estimates of marginal willingness to 
pay that are more than three times as large as estimates from a conventional model.  In other words, 
assuming that migration is costless would result in understating willingness to pay for air quality by 
roughly two-thirds. 
6  Conclusions 
This paper argues that mobility constraints hinder the use of conventional wage-hedonic techniques to 
estimate household willingness to pay for local amenities such as clean air.  We develop and implement a 
discrete-choice model that uses data on residential patterns, along with a flexible model of migration 
costs, to infer the utility of living in individual metropolitan areas across the U.S.  We then estimate the 
marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in air pollution, as measured by the ambient concentration of 
particulate matter (PM10), using the contribution of distant sources to local air pollution as an instrument. 
                                                       
22 Like the literature before them, Chay and Greenstone frame their results in terms of total suspended particulates (TSP), which 
was the preferred measure of particulate pollution prior to 1987.  In order to convert our WTP estimates to results in terms of 
TSP, one should divide our measures by approximately 1.82. 25 
 
Our  results  suggest  that  the  conventional  approach  (ignoring  mobility  costs)  substantially 
understates the true willingness to pay for air quality.  Our estimates imply that the median household 
would pay $149 to $185 for a one-unit reduction in PM10 concentrations, in constant 1982-1984 dollars.  
These estimates are three times as large as the corresponding estimate of marginal willingness to pay from 
a conventional hedonic model estimated using the same data.  Instrumenting for local air pollution makes 
a large difference in both models – confirming the findings of Chay and Greenstone (2005). 
These  findings  highlight  the  potential  importance  of  incorporating  mobility  constraints  into 
hedonic models.  We suspect that the consequences of ignoring mobility costs will be greater, the larger 
are those costs relative to the benefits at stake.  For example, while households value clean air, few are 
likely to leave behind their hometowns and families purely for the sake of modest reductions in air 
pollution.  More generally, mobility costs are more likely to constrain choices among metropolitan areas, 
rather than among neighborhoods within a metropolitan area. 
The adverse health impacts of air pollution have prompted a wide array of legislative responses at 
both the state and federal levels over the last thirty years.  Evaluated according to simple criteria (i.e., 
emissions  reductions  and  cost-effectiveness),  these  policies  are  generally  considered  to  have  been 
successful.  Even so, studies find that over 81 million Americans face unhealthy short-term exposure to 
PM, while 66 million live with chronically high exposure (American Lung Association, 2004).  This is 
cause for concern, particularly in light of current legislative efforts that would reduce the capacity of the 
EPA to regulate certain pollution sources (i.e., new power plants).  While most of these legislative efforts 
arise out of concern for the cost of compliance with EPA regulations, little is known about the size of the 
benefits.  This complicates careful evaluation based on efficiency criteria.  The present study suggests that 
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Percent birth region by residence region as of the year 2000 (U.S. Census data) 
 
  RESIDENCE IN 2000 
















Mountain  Pacific 
New 
England  65.02  5.87  2.35  0.94  12.68  0.47  1.88  3.05  7.75 
Mid-
Atlantic  4.03  63.34  4.55  1.03  18.04  0.22  2.13  2.49  4.18 
East North 




0.36  1.77  7.80  57.62  7.27  1.24  5.85  8.51  9.57 
South 
Atlantic  0.99  3.59  4.50  0.84  79.47  2.82  2.67  1.60  3.51 
East South 




0.47  1.54  2.13  1.42  6.51  2.49  77.75  3.31  4.38 
Mountain 
  0.89  1.11  3.54  2.43  3.54  1.11  5.09  69.03  13.27 
 
Pacific 
  0.86  1.61  3.42  1.52  5.13  1.14  2.75  7.69  75.88 
 
Notes:  Rows indicate birth regions; columns denote current residence.  For example, the upper-left-hand cell indicates that 65.02% of household heads born in New England were 
living in the region during the 2000 Census.  Regions are assigned according to Census definitions: Regional Definitions: (1) New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), (2) 
Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA), (3) East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), (4) West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO,NE, SD, ND), (5) South Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, 
NC, SC, VA, WV), (6) East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN), (7) West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX), (8) Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT), and (9) Pacific (AK, 
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Table A1 – Data Summary 
 
Variable  Mean  Description 
HSDROP  0.175  High school dropout 
HS  0.249  High school graduate 
SOMECOLL  0.291  Completed some college (not four year degree) 
COLL  0.286  College graduate 
WHITE  0.770  Race = White 
BLACK  0.125  Race = Black 
ASIAN  0.038  Race = Asian (Chinese, Japanese, other Asian or Pacific Islander) 
OTHER  0.063  American Indian and other racial categories 
AGE  49.36  Age of the household head 
MALE  0.651  Sex of the household head (1 = MALE, 0 = FEMALE) 
INCTOT  42305  Total income from employment 
ROOM2  0.047  2 rooms in dwelling 
ROOM3  0.096  3 rooms in dwelling 
ROOM4  0.148  4 rooms in dwelling 
ROOM5  0.192  5 rooms in dwelling 
ROOM6  0.194  6 rooms in dwelling 
ROOM7  0.128  7 rooms in dwelling 
ROOM8  0.088  8 rooms in dwelling 
ROOM9  0.086  9+ rooms in dwelling 
BED2  0.130  1 bedroom dwelling 
BED3  0.268  2 bedroom dwelling 
BED4  0.385  3 bedroom dwelling 
BED5  0.151  4 bedroom dwelling 
BED6  0.035  5+ bedroom dwelling 
YR1  0.018  0-1 year-old dwelling 
YR2  0.070  2-5 year-old dwelling 
YR3  0.070  6-10 year-old dwelling 
YR4  0.157  11-20 year-old dwelling 
YR5  0.176  21-30 year-old dwelling 
YR6  0.147  31-40 year-old dwelling 
YR7  0.138  41-50 year-old dwelling 
UNITS2  0.001  Boat, tent, van, other 
UNITS3  0.590  1 family house, detached 
UNITS4  0.066  1 family house, attached 
UNITS5  0.046  2 family building 
UNITS6  0.048  3-4 family building 
UNITS7  0.045  5-9 family building 
UNITS8  0.043  10-19 family building 
UNITS9  0.035  20-49 family building 
UNITS10  0.058  50+ family building 
ACRE1_9  0.104  Acreage of property 1-9 acres 
ACRE10  0.024  Acreage of property 10+ acres 
NOKITCH  0.007  Dwelling does not contain complete kitchen facilities 
NOPLUMB  0.005  Dwelling does not contain complete plumbing facilities 
OWNER  0.661  Dwelling owned 
RENTER  0.339  Dwelling Rented 
MSA_ID    Metropolitan Statistical Area identification number 
BLP    Birth state 42 
 
 








Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic 
CONSTANT  4.035  477.04  4.982  1504.54 
ROOM2  0.033  2.50  0.096  19.17 
ROOM3  0.058  4.04  0.115  22.18 
ROOM4  0.123  8.32  0.126  23.28 
ROOM5  0.217  14.51  0.208  37.57 
ROOM6  0.362  23.85  0.347  61.66 
ROOM7  0.524  34.16  0.495  86.81 
ROOM8  0.665  42.73  0.634  109.32 
ROOM9  0.857  54.55  0.855  145.26 
BED2  0.056  4.54  0.029  6.56 
BED3  0.124  9.41  0.107  22.67 
BED4  0.135  10.01  0.155  31.90 
BED5  0.162  11.68  0.221  43.95 
BED6  0.168  11.42  0.281  51.12 
YR1  0.534  79.52  0.479  161.47 
YR2  0.514  139.19  0.428  238.24 
YR3  0.384  104.74  0.363  206.21 
YR4  0.287  97.37  0.250  179.26 
YR5  0.209  69.61  0.129  97.76 
YR6  0.138  45.88  0.092  67.54 
YR7  0.056  15.93  0.064  47.10 
UNITS2  1.018  103.35  -0.449  -34.18 
UNITS3  1.154  261.36  0.748  460.14 
UNITS4  1.027  186.73  0.628  281.46 
UNITS5  1.283  217.15  0.873  344.37 
UNITS6  1.310  220.37  0.891  356.72 
UNITS7  1.297  217.80  0.886  351.96 
UNITS8  1.347  224.03  0.917  348.26 
UNITS9  1.304  204.79  0.842  302.06 
UNITS10  1.267  203.63  0.873  351.96 
ACRE1_9  0.086  28.99  0.164  120.88 
ACRE10  0.124  24.75  0.252  88.90 
NOKITCH  -0.091  -7.53  -0.041  -7.38 
NOPLUMB  -0.448  -36.09  -0.258  -44.53 
R
2  0.942  0.926 
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Table A3 – Summary of Income Regressions 
 















Constant  8.586  0.368  8.982  0.259 
MALE  0.621  0.121  0.549  0.098 
AGE>60  -0.072  0.142  -0.039  0.149 
WHITE  0.303  0.228  0.266  0.133 
HS  0.368  0.120  0.352  0.114 
SOMECOLL  0.515  0.175  0.537  0.164 
COLLGRAD  0.949  0.185  1.009  0.158 
 
 
 